神田順
中村哲の言葉医師として、パキスタン、アフガニスタンに赴き、用水路建設まで成し遂げた男が、2019年12月、ジャララバード市内で、凶弾に倒れた。享年73歳。多くの人の命を救うために働いた現代の偉人である。医師と構造エンジニアでは、することは全く異なるものの、その言葉に強く共感するものがあり、紹介したい。
ほとんどは、山岡淳一郎著「炎と水:中村哲と名もなき人たちの旅」による。建築基本法制定準備会の今年の総会後にも山岡氏から講演いただいたこともあり、心に留めておきたいとの思いからである。
1989年の福岡徳洲会病院10周年記念誌に残る言葉「私はペシャワール派遣医ということがほぼ内定しており、その準備の一環として第一線のプライマリー・ケアを学ぶ目的もあって」病院に1982年から1983年にかけて在籍した。地域住民のニーズに応える精神を啓発されたという。(同書36p)医師の側にも、人のためという意識がなければ、命を救うことにつながらない。
「誰も行かぬから、我々がゆく。誰もしないから、我々がする」という中村の合言葉は、内村鑑三の引いたメリー・ライオン女史の言葉がもとになっているというが、中学三年生の頭に刻み込まれたという。(同書106p)一人ではできないことを実践に移す力を持っていて、さらに人を説得する言葉を持っていた。生まれ環境もあるかもしれないというあたりは、「炎と水」を参照されたい。
僧職を継ぐ身であった蓮岡修は、戦場カメラマンを志し、何度かアフガニスタン国境戦闘地区にも入っている。ペシャワールで中村に面会し、貧しい人たちのための医療と言っても、難民キャンプの苦難さと比べたら、何のためかと思って問いかけたときに、「わしは馬鹿やけんね」と言われて、仏教でいう道理を感じたという。(同書168p)宮沢賢治の「雨ニモ負ケズ」の中の「デクノボートイワレ」が浮かぶ。
小泉純一郎首相が、テロ対策特措法を国会に上げたとき、自衛隊の派遣も検討された。アフガニスタンから帰った中村は、寄付を募って食料配布する基金立ち上げにかかわる中、国会で参考人として呼ばれ「自衛隊派遣が、いま取りざたされておるようでありますが、当地の事情を考えますと有害無益でございます」(同書208p)と断言した。これまで現地で築いてきた現地の人間との信頼感が、武力が出てくることで崩されかねないと続けたという。自分のやっていることがアフガニスタンの人の命を救っているというのに、軍隊が救えるのかという思いであったろう。
用水路工事の助っ人としてやってきた伊藤和也は、現地にとけこみ人々からも好かれていたが、2008年8月、アフガニスタンで、拉致され、翌日殺された。誰が何のためにか、事件の背景はわからないままという。中村は「世間に対してわたしは謝りません」と言ったという。(同書308p)安全のための対策をとっていても、事件は起きる。政府からは、スタッフを帰国させるよう圧力もあって、一部は引き上げてもいた時期の出来事であった。
中村もリスクの多い中で死を覚悟していたという。どこにいても近くに戦闘があるわけで、スタッフを守り切れなかった無念も当然にあったろう。1984年の西日本新聞のインタビューには「医療に恵まれないパキスタンで一粒の麦になりたい」という言葉を残している。(同書420p)あとがきでは、2010年の徳洲会グループで病院長を前にした演壇での言葉が紹介されている。「世界中を救おうなんて思っていない。「地域支援」の一環だと思っています。それがたまたまとんでもなく遠いところにあっただけ。長年いればいろんな愛着も湧いてくるし、本格的にやろうとすれば、つまみ食いするわけにはいかんのです。」(同書403p)そう言って、水を引く大事業をやってのけた。建築家だって同じではないか。震災復興まちづくりと言っても、つまみ食いでいなくなってはいまいかと思ったりした。
そして、最後の言葉が、これからの世界のあり方として「自然と和解すること」だ。先日のNHKラジオで中村哲のことが紹介されていて、この言葉が耳に残った。現代社会は、人間だけがいい気分でいられるようにと、技術開発をして便利な世の中にするのは良いが、結果的に化石燃料を燃やしエネルギーを大量に消費している。戦争だって、ほとんどそのことが原因となっている。自然とどう対話して、お互い認め合いながら、われわれは生きていくのか。これまでの自然から一方的に取り上げることを反省し、どこまでなら許されるか、しっかり考えてみる必要があると、中村哲の言葉からあらためて思ったのである。
Wada sensei and everyone. Below is one of my Journal entries. It sums up what happened here. Our analysis shows 8000 fatalities at the end...
7/11, 2:30 pm, La Guaira We headed back to the same location we had visited a couple days earlier — the La Mar area. It was the first zone we investigated. A Japanese TV crew, NHK, followed us. They had appeared in many major disaster scenes over the years and had taped me countless times. Sunlight was peeking through the clouds.
Anatomy of failure. The building code here changed around 2000 to include modern seismic detailing, so anything built before that was dangerous. Our analysis showed that approximately 10,000 buildings had been destroyed in sudden pancake collapses. Ground‑level columns were pushed far beyond their capacity because there was no ductile detailing — no reinforcement pattern that allowed columns to deform and survive. The collapse sequence was brutal and fast: the ground column buckled, and everything above followed instantly.
Our team moved together through the destruction. Giulia was with us — a veteran disaster‑response engineer who had been on our front lines since the 2021 Haiti earthquake. She had seen every type of collapse imaginable. Rainer was there too — former UNOPS director. We had worked side by side in Haiti back in 2010, where we formulated the reconstruction strategy together after that massive earthquake. He brought discipline and deep operational experience as we worked with other UN partners. And Daniel — a civil engineer and local businessman. We first met him in Haiti more than 15 years ago. He understood both engineering and community dynamics, and he had a deep network across business and government here. Together, they formed the backbone of our expert team.
As NHK taped us, the four of us moved through collapsed buildings one by one. We entered one of the newer constructions. It had been a large international hotel a week ago. Now its parking‑structure upper floor was leaning on the ground. You could read the event clearly. Columns and beams were exposed, concrete cover had fallen off, and I could see the inside guts. There was plenty of reinforcement and it looked like proper detailing. I told Giulia I didn’t see why this failed — it looked pretty good. She pointed to the beam‑column joint and said, “Look at the beam rebar embedment. Only a few centimeters. It should be at least 50.” She was right. Without proper embedment, beams peeled off the column like nothing.
Right next to this building, a rescue crew crawled over debris trying to reach a victim buried underneath. They worked hard even though everyone knew there was almost no hope.
We moved to an area with hundreds of social‑housing buildings — four‑story apartments. They were built with metal studs, but about half of them had first‑floor pancake failures. Classic soft‑story collapse. It puzzled me because this type of lightweight construction usually resisted collapse. As Giulia and I dug through the sites, we noticed a few things. The floor was heavy — six inches of cast‑in‑place concrete. The metal‑stud details were weak, only a couple screws for critical braces. But most significantly, the exterior non‑structural finish above the second level used rigid plywood, while the ground floor only had thin cement board. Plywood has strong shear capacity; cement board does not. That mismatch created soft‑story failure and killed hundreds of people here.
Rain started pounding on our dusty helmets.
Going forward. We were alert and tired as we prepared to report our findings to the Ministry of Public Works. They had set up a headquarters near the most destructive zone. The Vice President of Public Works and his team were waiting at a large table inside a tent structure. We began presenting our plans based on these findings.
First, technical support and repair guidance for slightly or moderately damaged neighborhoods. There was plenty of hidden damage inside these homes — things you could not see from outside. Residents had no idea what had happened to their houses. They were uncertain and afraid to live inside. We planned to send teams of engineers to inspect homes, explain what had occurred, and guide residents on how to repair minor damage and strengthen their houses. This was critical for this somewhat neglected neighborhood. I knew our engineering team’s presence would make a huge impact on the recovery process.
Second, a program for heavily damaged neighborhoods. We would categorize black buildings as collapsed or near‑collapse structures. We would quantify debris volume and demolition difficulty. Blue buildings were those that looked severely damaged but were mostly non‑structural hollow‑clay masonry infill failures — these could be repaired fairly simply and made better than before. We would quantify the repair magnitude. And the green tag: no damage.
All of this would be organized in GIS mapping. This would be critical information for debris management and the recovery process. We could deploy an engineering team of 100 to do this quickly, funded by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Disaster and Humanitarian Response.
We presented our method to the Vice President of Public Works and his team. He was a civil engineer, and he immediately understood that what we were proposing made sense. After the presentation, he asked a few questions, listened carefully to our answers, then smiled and said, “Do it as fast as possible. People are waiting. We will also contribute engineers to the team.” We were official now. Tomorrow we would start.
Rain stopped outside and darkness settled over the coastline. It had been a long day, but our team was elated. We could finally begin to assist the people of Venezuela.